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A PhD student in Britain, who traveled to Iran prior to the western-backed street riots, is Moussavi’s “aide”

So I guess Moussavi has a dearth of people who live in Iran and are qualified to be his aides and has chosen as his aide a student living in the UK? I can only imagine Obama’s campaign aide living in Sweden or something like that, and traveling to the U.S just before or during elections. Yes, that makes a lot of sense.

Mousavi aide banned from leaving Iran

The head of defeated presidential candidate Mir-Hossein Mousavi’s information committee, Abolfazl Fateh, has not been allowed to leave the country for Britain.

Following the recent incidents and a move by some Mousavi supporters to provoke people to hold “illegal gatherings”, Fateh – who is a PhD student in Britain – has been banned from leaving Iran, Fars news agency reported.

Fateh has been banned from leaving the country so that some issues behind the gatherings can be clarified, the news agency reported.

Following the announcement of the results of Iran’s 10th presidential elections, supporters of some candidates took to the streets to protest against alleged irregularities in the election process.

Meanwhile, Iran’s Interior Ministry has repeatedly declared that it has not issued any permit for the rallies and has stressed that such protests are illegal.

Iranian authorities have urged the defeated presidential candidates and their supporters to lodge their complaints through legal channels, rather than staging street protests.


Who threw whom into the sea?

I got this in the mail so I thought I would post it — it’s excerpts from an article that appeared in the recent issue of the Journal of Palestine Studies.

The Fall of Haifa

Caption: zionist terrorists forcing Palestinian civilians out of Haifa at gunpoint

The all-out Zionist attack on Haifa began in the early morning of Wednesday, 21 April 1948, and ended the following day with the fall of the city into Zionist hands. Within a week, some 50,000 Arab inhabitants had been expelled. The attack was not an isolated phenomenon, nor was it a reaction to any local Arab initiative. It was an important phase of the general Zionist offensive begun on 1 April that was to pave the way for the proclamation of the State of Israel.

Until 1 April, the Zionists had confined themselves to sniping, mortar shelling, and the planting of time bombs and booby-trapped vehicles in Arab urban areas, and to hit-and-run attacks in the countryside wherein several houses at a time would be blown up over the heads of their inhabitants. But the Zionists did not begin to seize and hold on to Arab territory until their new April offensive, which was motivated primarily by political considerations.

The Setting

[The April] offensive aimed at consolidating and broadening the areas under Zionist occupation by clearing them of Arabs and by linking them [i.e., the Zionist areas] more closely together. It was to this end that Operation Nachshon was launched on 1 April to carve out an adequate corridor from Tel Aviv on the coast to Jerusalem in the interior. This involved the occupation and destruction of a score of Arab villages and culminated in the Battle of Castel on 11 April. (The Dayr Yasin massacre by the Irgunists on 9 April was an integral part of Operation Nachshon.) As soon as the operation, which resulted in the expulsion of 10,000 to 15,000 Arab villagers, was concluded on 13 April, Operation Jephtha was launched to clear Eastern Galilee of Arabs and to link Tiberias with Safed. Operation Jephtha was inaugurated with the seizure of Tiberias on 18 April and the expulsion of its Arab inhabitants, about 4,500, a number that was swollen threefold by refugees from neighboring villages as Operation Jephtha proceeded.

Haifa was not coveted only for its relative importance, but as a prize in itself. It was the greatest Arab harbor in the Eastern Mediterranean after Alexandria. It was the terminal point of the oil pipeline from Iraq (and therefore perhaps an important bargaining lever with the Arabs). It was a key rail and road communication center. It was in close proximity to the “industrial belt” that skirted the bay of Acre.

To the Arabs, Haifa was an integral part of their country. Their aim was to see that it did not fall into Zionist hands, but the most they could do was simply to hold their ground. Their position at the foot of the Carmel ridge, with the Jewish quarters dominating them from higher ground, was precarious in the extreme. Though Arab villages such as Balad al-Shaykh in the east and Tireh in the south were near at hand, the strategic approaches to the city were completely dominated by Zionist settlements, such that reinforcements from farther afield could often reach Haifa only at suicidal cost to the Arabs themselves.

As soon as street fighting broke out in Haifa after the UN partition decision in November, Muslim and Christian residents of the city formed an Arab National Committee (ANC). Its chairman was Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim, a benign 62-yearold gentleman who looked and felt out of his depth in the bewildering series of situations he was called upon to face. Broadly speaking, the ANC was politically responsible to the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) for Palestine, but militarily it depended for supplies on the Arab League Military Committee based in Damascus. On 28 December 1947, the ANC engaged a young and energetic lieutenant in the Arab Legion, Muhammad Hamad al-Huneidi, who resigned his commission to volunteer his services as the local commander. Huneidi acted under the ANC and was put in charge of all security matters. When he took over, the Haifa National Guard numbered 75 members armed with weapons ranging from rifles to wooden clubs and canes. By the time Huneidi was killed in action on 17 March, as he was returning from Lebanon with supplies, the National Guard had increased to about 350. Many of these were members of sporting organizations in Haifa, and some were ex-servicemen who had served with the British army on the Egyptian front during World War II. About half were part-timers, and the vast majority were from Haifa itself. Under Huneidi, the town was divided into ten security zones, each under a local defense group led by a person reporting directly to a central headquarters. The limiting factor was always arms supplies, and the most frustrating problem was obtaining the right ammunition to match the rich variety of rifles, which included not a few museum pieces. Huneidi was ably assisted by Yunis Naffa, a sanitary inspector in Haifa with a flair for military organization. Upon Huneidi’s death, he temporarily took over command of the National Guard before the arrival of Huneidi’s replacement. Continue reading